The Pegasus problem
The key to understanding this week's blockbuster reporting on Pegasus spyware is that it's not really telling us anything new. Anyone who's attended our awareness training will know that Pegasus has been a recurring feature since we started the company in 2016. We know that Pegasus is widely used. We know that (despite denials from its manufacturer) it has been used to target journalists and activists. We know it is constantly evolving to take advantage of 'zero-day' or unknown vulnerabilities. The real issue is that governments are perfectly aware of Pegasus and its many competitors, but nothing has been done to combat them because governments are their customers - and if they're not, it's only because they've developed similar (or better) tools themselves.
Pegasus is made by the NSO Group. It's based in Israel but a London-based venture capital fund holds a majority stake. It's part of a thriving (and highly profitable) ecosystem bringing together finance, researchers, software developers which exploits the ongoing failure of leading technology companies to produce safer products. This week, Google's highly-respected Threat Analysis Group tried to explain why attackers are using so many undisclosed (or 'zero-day') vulnerabilities. Google argues a key reason is that products and devices are more secure, so attackers need to chain together more vulnerabilities in order to compromise them. A cryptography professor suggests the real reason is that the technology we use is riddled with bugs and manufacturers spend far too little time and money on fixing them properly.
One item from this week's reporting caught our eye; phones with US and Israeli numbers are off limits to Pegasus. NSO has said this before, but it raises the obvious question, "Why?" The probable explanation lies in the close ties between Washington and Tel Aviv, and the requirement that the Israeli government approves exports of Pegasus. So, one protection against it might be to obtain a US or Israeli phone number, as a former spyware insider explained to Threatpost. Other than that, there are limited protections. Updating devices is important, but not a panacea because of the number of vulnerabilities that no-one knows about and which can be used to replace other issues as they're fixed. And, in any case, writing bug-free software is impossible. What could be done is to make life much more difficult for NSO and its ilk. That requires concerted action from the technology sector and from governments. Alas, we're not holding our breath.